A key feature of human thought and language is compositionality, the ability to bind pre-existing concepts or word meanings together in order to express new ideas. Here we ask how newly composed complex concepts are mentally represented and matched to the outside world, by testing whether it is harder to verify if a picture matches the meaning of a phrase, like big pink tree, than the meaning of a single word, like tree. Five sentence-picture verification experiments provide evidence that, in fact, the meaning of a phrase can often be checked just as fast as the meaning of one single word (and sometimes faster), indicating that the phrase's constituent concepts can be represented and checked in parallel. However, verification times were increased when matched phrases had more complex modification structures, indicating that it is costly to represent structural relations between constituent concepts. This pattern of data can be well-explained if concepts are composed together using two different mechanisms, binding by synchrony and binding by asynchrony, which have been suggested as solutions to the ''binding problem" faced in both vision science and higher-level cognition. Our results suggest that they can also explain aspects of compositional language processing.
Introduction
Compositionality is a key feature of human thought and language: We can effortlessly combine older, more basic concepts and word meanings in order to express an unbounded number of new ideas. For instance, even though the words Spotted, Pink, and Tree are rarely juxtaposed, they can be quickly composed together to create a coherent semantic interpretation.
Work in linguistic semantics, philosophy, and psychology has considerably advanced our understanding of how complex concepts, such as the meanings of phrases, might be built from their component parts (Heim & Kratzer, 1998; Pylkkänen & McElree, 2006; Werning, Hinzen, & Machery, 2012) . This has included discoveries about the role of broader world knowledge in interpreting the meanings of phrases (Barner & Snedeker, 2008; Springer & Murphy, 1992) , and about the neural implementation of combinatorial operations (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011; Frankland & Greene, 2015; Pylkkänen & McElree, 2007) .
However, amongst this research there is a surprising gap in our knowledge: we know little about how composed representations are held in mind in order to be matched against the world. While we know a great deal about how individual words (like spotted, pink or tree) are stored in working memory (Baddeley, 2003) , and about how complex concepts can, with experience, be ''chunked" into simple units (Cowan, Chen, & Rouder, 2004) , we know much less about how newly encountered combinations of concepts are mentally represented. For example, how does the representation of a complex concept, such as big pink tree, differ from the representation of a singleton concept, such as tree, or from the representation of a list of word meanings, such as big, pink, tree? Do complex representations, built by stacking ever more concepts, also demand ever more working memory? Can some complex concepts be stored in very efficient ways?
Some of the most relevant work has been on the idea of gist representations, the proposal that, as we read or listen to text, we discard our precise memories of the exact linguistic input and replace them with less precise summaries of that input's meaning. Theories of gist can explain how and why we discard less-relevant information about a sentence, but their accounts of meaning (in which, for example, sentences are recoded as sets of propositions, Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Kintsch, 1998) are more suited for explaining the representation of large chunks of text rather than characterizing the representations of simple concepts such as big pink tree. For example, it is unclear how the gists of tree and pink tree might differ. Potter (1993) 
